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ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN FOOD STAPLES MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM RECENT 
RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MOZAMBIQUE 
 




This brief reviews results of applied research regarding the role of government in staple food markets in 
East and Southern Africa. The purpose of the brief is to draw lessons for Mozambique as it decides how to 
use the grain storage silos it has been building since 2009.  The authors suggest that: 
  Mozambique is in an unusually strong position to take advantage of private sector activity to 
stabilize prices over time and space; 
  Additional investment in road and rail infrastructure, incentives, and institutions, would help bring 
down transaction costs and allow private action to further stabilize prices; 
  Additional stabilization, for those times when Mozambique has to rely on imports from the world 
market beyond what they normally make, could be obtained in a cost efficient manner using a 
financial reserve; and  
  If the government chooses also to maintain a public physical reserve, then several conditions 
(listed in the brief) are necessary for operating this in a manner that improves market performance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION:  The worldwide food price 
crisis of 2007 and 2008 focused the world’s 
attention on issues of staple food availability and 
the level and stability of staple food prices.   
Donors, who by 2006 had reduced support to 
agriculture to 4% of development aid from 20% in 
1980, quickly began to reverse course, 
programming more funds for agriculture and food 
security.  Many governments in East and Southern 
Africa (ESA), facing the specter of skyrocketing 
prices and their human and political costs, reacted 
by closing borders and, in some cases, heavily 
regulating internal trade: Zambia, Malawi, and 
Tanzania all applied export bans on maize at some 
point during this period, Malawi attempted to ban 
private maize trade, and Malawi and Zambia 
dramatically increased maize purchases by their 
state marketing boards.   
 
Since the late 1980s, and unlike its neighbors, 
Mozambique’s government has engaged in almost 
no direct intervention in its maize markets.   
AGRICOM was disbanded during the early 1990s, 
and Instituto de Cereais had only a short-lived 
presence in the market in the late 1990s.  Borders 
have remained open to regular maize imports into 
the south and periodic large exports to Malawi out 
of the north.  Yet Mozambique’s leaders have not 
been unaffected by the general sense of unease 
unleashed by the international food price crisis.   
One response has been a government project to 
construct silos for storage of staple grains; this 
would mark the first time in over a decade that the 
Mozambican government has actively 
contemplated intervening in food staples markets.   
 
The plan is to construct 143,000 mt of silo 
capacity by 2011 (Government of Mozambique, 
2008. p. 91). As part of this plan, six new silos 
with 50,000 mt of capacity had been built by 
January 2009 in Tete Province (Portal do Governo 
de Moçambique, 2009). The specific objectives of 
constructing silos are not clear but are part of a 
broad commercialization plan that seeks to 
“…enable purchasing of grain surpluses…” to, 
among other things, “… smooth the effects of 
external shocks on domestic prices.”
1 (PAPA, 
2008, p. 80). 
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Decisions regarding the use of these silos are 
central to Mozambique’s agricultural marketing 
and food security policy.  As the country moves 
ahead on this front, it has the opportunity to learn 
from a great deal of applied research that has been 
done on this topic.  In the remainder of this brief, 
we first highlight what this research has shown 
about the basic characteristics of southern African 
staple cereals markets.  We then review what has 
been learned about the way in which governments 
have intervened in these markets and the effects 
that these approaches have had on price behavior 
and market performance; we speak directly to the 
issue of public sector stockholding but do not 
limit ourselves to that topic.  We close with 
suggestions for the way forward in Mozambique.  
 
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FOOD 
STAPLES MARKETS IN EAST AND 
SOUTHERN AFRICA:  Food staples markets 
across the region exhibit a number of common 
characteristics. First, because production is 
rainfed, year-to-year variability in production is 
high. Year-on-year production changes average 
about 20% across the region, with frequent 
changes of 50% or more (Tschirley et al, 2006).  
Second, these markets are “thin”, meaning that a 
small share – well under half -- of production is 
marketed in any given year.  A basic characteristic 
of thin markets is that year-to-year variation in 
marketed volumes tends to be substantially greater 
than variation in production.  Third, demand for 
maize tends to be “inelastic”, i.e., demand does 
not change greatly when the price changes. This is 
especially true in southern and interior areas of the 
region (Zimbabwe, southern Malawi, all but 
northern Zambia, and Mozambique south of the 
Zambezi River), where the share of maize in 
consumers’ diets typically lies around 40% 
(Tschirley and Jayne 2010).   
 
These markets are also poorly financed.  The 
mostly small farmers that supply them have 
almost no access to seasonal finance, and because 
they have cash needs at the time of harvest, they 
tend to sell around that time, with very little 
storage into the hungry season.  This tendency is 
exacerbated by the lack of modern storage 
infrastructure ensure quality maintenance.   
Functioning warehouse receipt systems would 
solve both the credit and the infrastructure 
problems but are severely underdeveloped 
(Coulter 2010).   
 
These characteristics – variable production, even 
more variable marketed volumes, inelastic 
demand, and poor financing and storage 
infrastructure – all lead to very high seasonal and 
inter-annual price variability.  In the maize 
producing area of Zambia, for example, average 
year-to-year changes in real maize prices range 
from 28% to nearly 50%, depending on the 
market; average seasonal price rises range from 
60% to 100%. In northern and central 
Mozambique, average seasonal price rises are 
70%-80%, but during at least two of the past 10 
years, seasonal movements have been negative.   
Year-to-year changes have exceeded 20% more 
than half the time.  These figures in all three 
countries reflect a great deal of risk for all 
participants in the market. 
 
This price variability matters for at least three 
reasons. First, most urban consumers are poor and 
spend a large share of income on basic foods; 
seasonal price rises can have a major impact on 
their ability to maintain adequate consumption.   
Second, most farmers do not benefit from the high 
prices frequently seen in these systems, for a host 
of reasons: typically in the region 20%-30% sell 
maize, but most do so right after harvest when 
prices are low; another 20%-30% neither sell nor 
buy, and so are unaffected by these prices; and 
40%-50% are net buyers, buying more than they 
sell (and most often not selling anything) and are 
therefore hurt by high prices.   
 
Third, price variability matters for longer-term 
reasons.  As Poulton et al. (2006) note, price 
instability discourages investment in staples 
production by surplus households that have the 
assets and “knowhow” produce much more; it 
encourages deficit households to devote scarce 
resources to staple food production to ensure their 
food security, limiting diversification and the 
increased incomes that typically come with it; and 
it limits off-farm investment in services such as 
input supply, provision of credit, and storage and 
processing.  We thus see a vicious circle, in which 
price variability reinforces behaviors that lead to 
continued price instability. 
 
These problems in domestic systems take on even 
greater importance when paired with potentially 
more unstable international food markets.  It is 
thus understandable why governments in the 
region might want seriously to address instability 
in their own markets and perhaps insulate these   3
markets from international price movements.  In 
the rest of this paper we ask what empirical 
research says about the results of past attempts to 
do this.   
 
KEY FINDINGS:  Our reading of applied research in 
the region highlights six key findings: 
 
Country context matters: The magnitude and 
consequences of food price risk and instability 
differ by country, and sometimes by region within 
the same country (Byerlee, Jayne, and Myers, 
2006), and are influenced by (a) varying agro-
ecological and socio-economic conditions (b) 
increasing maize deficits in the region, (c) more 
diversified food consumption patterns, (d) 
decreasing proportions of households with maize 
surpluses, (e) poor coordination between 
government and private traders (Jayne, Zulu, and 
Nijhoff, 2006), (f) low provision of public goods 
(Jayne, Chapoto, and Govereh, 2008), and (g) 
politics (Tschirley and Jayne, 2010; Jayne, 
Chapoto, and Govereh, 2008). But regardless of 
the source, price risk and instability entail 
significant human costs (Byerlee, Jayne, and 
Myers, 2006; Tschirley and Jayne, 2010). 
Governments need to understand the specific 
context of their own country to be able to design 
efficient agricultural policies.  
 
Since the start of liberalization in the early 
1990s, governments have continued to involve 
themselves in markets. Most food markets in ESA 
have been significantly liberalized, but this has 
not meant the absence of direct government action 
in food markets. On the contrary, governments in 
ESA have repeatedly intervened in food markets 
even before the 2007/08 crisis.  Government’s 
actions during the recent price spikes in food 
markets are just an escalation of previous trends, 
not a sudden change in policy.  
 
This involvement has been primarily through 
parastatal marketing boards, discretionary 
control of trade policy, and subsidized fertilizer.  
Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya have used all these 
instruments.  Malawi has pursued these policies 
through its National Food Reserve Agency and 
ADMARC, its well known fertilizer “starter 
packs”, and comprehensive control of maize 
imports and exports.  Zambia has dramatically 
increased maize purchases through its Food 
Reserve Agency in recent years; its control of 
trade is less comprehensive than in Malawi but is 
nonetheless a major factor that private traders 
have to take into account in their decisions.   
Kenya has used its National Cereals and Produce 
Marketing Board to make purchases and export 
maize, and suffered a major “maize scandal” over 
political influence and profiteering in 2008/09.   
Alone among these countries, Malawi has tried to 
control retail maize trade through its system of 
retail shops (ADMARC) and attempted in 2008 to 
outlaw all private maize trade.  
 
Expenditure on these programs has led to 
inadequate expenditure on the public goods that 
drive long-term growth and poverty reduction:. 
Over the four agricultural seasons from 2005/06 to 
2008/2009, Malawi spent about $500 million to 
subsidize fertilizer and seeds for poor farmers 
(Dorward and Chirwa, 2009). Tembo et al (2009) 
show that fertilizer subsidies and parastatal maize 
operations in Zambia together ranged from 50% to 
70% of the country’s total agricultural budget 
between 2003 and 2009; between 2000 and 2008, 
agricultural investment and crops research 
averaged less than 7% of the budget (Govereh et 
al, 2009).  Partly as a result of this budgetary 
allocation in favor of what might be called private 
goods, investment in public goods such as roads, 
extension services and agricultural research has 
been shortchanged. It is primarily these public 
goods that will drive long-term increases in 
productivity and rapid poverty reduction. 
 
The effect of these government actions on 
domestic market performance may have 
increased instability rather than decreased it.  In 
Zambia and Malawi, government management of 
imports has helped drive prices above import 
parity several times during the past decade 
(Tschirley and Jayne, 2010).  Mismanagement of 
Malawi’s grain reserve in 2001 led to massive 
price rises during the 2001/02 marketing season 
(Devereaux, 2002).  One key reason for this 
outcome is government’s inability to commit to a 
rule-based, less-discretionary policy, even if such 
a commitment allowed direct government 
involvement during periods of scarcity and high 
prices.  As a result, unpredictable government 
behavior creates a great deal of risk for private 
traders, reducing their incentives to perform the 
trade and storage that could otherwise satisfy 
many of government’s food security objectives 
(NEPAD, 2004; see also below). In the end, 
producers and consumers both lose. Small farmers 
are penalized for producing a surplus by falling   4
prices and lack of market, which reduces their 
incentives to produce. Consumers have also faced 
greater instability in grain markets, with respect to 
both physical quantities available and price. In 
most cases, therefore, experience with strategic 
grain reserves – and the ad hoc trade policy that 
often goes with them -- in this part of Africa up to 
now has been less than satisfactory (NEPAD, 
2004). 
 
Yet governments cannot credibly leave 
themselves completely out of these markets, for 
two reasons: First, the well known weaknesses of 
food markets in ESA mean that, at least for the 
medium-term future, the level of seasonal and 
inter-annual price variability that would prevail 
under purely private sector activity is likely to 
periodically exceed what will be politically 
acceptable.  Second, the political importance of 
these markets means that governments, especially 
democratically elected governments, must be seen 
to be “doing something” (Poulton et al., 2006) to 
make these markets work better. 
 
So the relevant question is not how to end 
government involvement in food markets, but 
rather how to structure this involvement so that it 
has positive effects on long-term market 
development.  We turn to this in the next section, 
focusing on Mozambique, and on the positive 
lessons that emerge from recent research. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MOZAMBIQUE:   
Mozambique is in an unusually strong position 
to take advantage of private sector activity to 
stabilize prices over time and space: The country 
has major ports and transport corridors in 
northern, southern, and central provinces. Recent 
construction of a new bridge linking the grain 
surplus region of north and the center of the 
country will reduce transport costs and 
reinvigorate the active private sector already 
linking north surplus regions with central 
Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia, and the grain 
deficit south with central Mozambique and South 
Africa.  
 
Additional investment in road and rail 
infrastructure, incentives, and institutions, 
would help bring down transaction costs and 
allow private action to further stabilize prices: 
Long-run market development that creates a more 
stable environment for producers, traders, and 
society at large should be at the top of government 
agenda rather than short run “remedial” measures 
to respond to price risk and instability. Byerlee, 
Jayne, and Myers (2006) suggest that market-
based, privately-run risk management mechanisms 
such as warehouse receipt systems can improve 
competitiveness by (a) providing better access to 
formal credit markets through reliable, verifiable 
collateral for loans, (b) facilitating private storage 
and management of seasonal price risks, and (c) 
making food marketing more efficient by acting as 
a clearinghouse that enforces ownership claims 
and guarantees performance on contracts. 
 
However, emergence of such market-based 
mechanisms with high potential for reducing price 
risk and instability requires an investment in 
“enabling environment” in the form of basic 
infrastructure and institutions. 
 
Additional stabilization, for those times when 
Mozambique has to rely on imports from the 
world market beyond what they normally make, 
could be obtained in a cost efficient manner 
using a financial reserve: Experience in Malawi 
shows clearly that operating a food reserve is an 
expensive business that can exacerbate food crises 
rather than stabilizing prices (Byerlee, Jayne, and 
Myers, 2006; NEPAD 2004). For countries like 
Mozambique, with major ports and transport 
corridors, the best option for price stabilization 
during food crises may be a financial reserve 
(Poulton et al., 2006).  A financial reserve is a 
fund drawn upon only to enable food imports food 
in case of emergencies. This fund can take the 
form of a commitment to call for funds when a set 
of well specified criteria for using such funds have 
been met, or take the form of an account in 
foreign currency with an accredited financial 
institution (NEPAD, 2004).  
 
If the government chooses also to maintain a 
public physical reserve, then the conditions for 
operating this in a manner that improves market 
performance are (Byerlee, Jayne, and Myers, 
2006; NEPAD 2004): (a) Central Bank type 
autonomy, with independence from political 
process and clear and well defined objectives, (b) 
highly professional management with a good 
information system and  strong analytical 
capacity, (c) flexibility to hold the combination of 
grain and financial reserves that minimizes costs 
with acceptable risk, and (d) clear and open rules 
for market intervention to ensure transparency in 
its interventions.   5
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